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Since 9/11 the world has regarded 
Pakistan and Afghanistan as the epicentre 
of Islamic fundamentalism. Many of the 
early observations dealt with the 
tremendous challenge that terrorism and 
religious-militant extremism would pose for 
peace and stability from a geopolitical 
perspective. Realising the increasingly 
complex scenarios as well as the 
causalities and impacts, analyses on the 
phenomenon under discussion were 
slowly but persistently broadening. In 
order to be able to address not only the 
militant, but also the socio-economic and 
political dimensions of Islamic 
fundamentalism - the networks and 
ideological foundations of internationally 
acting fundamentalist groups have 
increasingly caught the attention of 
observers worldwide. Nevertheless, 
despite a general broadening of the 
research focus when it comes to Islamic 
fundamentalism, it also led to the 
phenomenon of only seeing part of the 
story: First, being pre-occupied with the 
security aspects of the Islamist challenge 
in the context of the foreign intervention in 
Afghanistan, many analysts, initially had a 
narrow focus on the ‘AfPak’ region. 
Consequently, fundamentalist 
developments in other parts of the Indian 
subcontinent were not adequately 
recognized until today. Second, today it 
seems that this trend of ignoring or 
neglecting the rise of Islamic fanaticism in 
other South Asian countries with Muslim 
majorities, such as Bangladesh or the 
Maldives, seems to continue.  
 
In order to understand the distortion in the 
scholarly engagement with Islamic 
fundamentalism, one has to look at the 
different reasoning and interests of 
research, which changed over time. In the 
earlier years, the clear focus of monitoring 
and analysing was to get a deeper 
understanding of the organizational 
structure of militant Islamist groups 
operating in the AfPak region in order to 
develop an adequate strategy for a military 
solution. Furthermore, research findings 
stressed the anti-democratic and anti-
systemic potential of Taliban and other 
militant Islamist oppositional forces in 
order to provide foreign involved 
governments with the necessary 
arguments to justify missions and budgets 
for their missions in Afghanistan.  
 
However, it seems that recent endeavours 
have been concentrating on identifying 
arguments aimed at sustaining that claim 
that Islamic militants merely pose a 
regionally limited threat: in other words it 
‘only’ affects Pakistan and Afghanistan and 
if a negotiated settlement is achieved, the 
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Taliban-problem will be solved 
automatically. It is obvious that this 
strategy only serves the purpose of 
ensuring a safe and smooth withdrawal of 
foreign troops while creating the image of 
having provided a framework for a minimal 
level of stability.  
It is noteworthy to mention that analysts 
who follow this line of argumentation try to 
introduce a separation between the 
Afghani Pakistani Taliban. Despite the fact 
that this distinction partly matches the 
reality of different organisational 
structures, tactics, strategies, and 
recruiting patterns of the Taliban operating 
in the region, it ignores the commonalities 
when it comes to ideological foundation, 
spiritual leadership and central command 
which justifies the description of the 
Taliban as a coherent whole movement. In 
this context, one also has to point out that 
the Taliban are only a facet, of a much 
larger, Islamic fundamentalist movement. 
This phenomenon of an interconnected 
Islamist movement sector, pushed by 
transnational religious extremist 
organisations, like the Muslim Brotherhood 
or al-Qaida, is dramatically rising in South 
Asia. For example, al-Qaida through Bin 
Laden’s 1998 declaration calling for an 
internationally coordinated Jihad, which 
was signed by terrorist organisations with 
links to Pakistan and Bangladesh, gave a 
remarkable impetus to cooperation 
between the different militant groups.  
 
Obviously, this apparition -the emergence 
of an increasing interlinked international 
Islamist movement- undermines the 
rationale of legitimizing the process of 
negotiation with the Taliban. It is important 
to understand, that the Taliban and other 
Islamist groups as anti-systemic and anti-
democratic forces are bounded by as well 
as trapped in a common fundamentalist 
ideology and, in order to keep the whole 
movement going, it has to reject any 
democratic system of governance. 
Because the Islamist’s major goal is to 
establish Islamic fundamentalist state – 
not only in Afghanistan but also in the 
Maldives, Pakistan and Bangladesh too. 
However, in order for the US to ensure a 
safe withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
Washington will remain ignorant towards 
this threat. 
 
Additionally, by properly recognizing the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism that is 
transforming Bangladesh into a hub of 
international militancy, would 
consequentially call for measures by the 
international community (presuming that 
there is a coherent logic of the ‘war 
against terror’). However, the US and its 
allies are ‘exhausted’ and not keen on any 
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new assignment. Therefore, western 
observers prefer to pick up other 
flashpoints, like the disastrous working 
environment in Bangladesh's textile 
industry. This is without any doubt a very 
crucial issue and deserves much attention. 
However, focusing on other themes is 
conveniently helping western government 
in two ways:  
First, it draws the international 
community’s attention away from growing 
Islamic fundamentalism, which arguably 
poses the most dangerous challenge to 
Bangladesh at this moment. However, by 
using the strategy of general ignorance, 
the international community does not have 
to justify their reluctance to tackle this 
problem. But decision makers should be 
aware that the chosen tactic not only leads 
to the neglect of everything Bangladesh 
stands for, especially the idea of secular 
democracy in a Muslim majority country, 
but it also threatens to put the country 
back to square one, i.e. the return to an 
atmosphere comparable to the days of 
West Pakistan’s dictate. The difference 
would be that instead of being under the 
choke of West-Pakistani military rulers, 
Bangladeshis would be controlled by 
Jihadist organisations which emerged in or 
are supported by Pakistan.  
Second, the strategy of focusing on ‘less-
critical issues’ offers politicians and 
academics an alternative field of activities 
to get active in Bangladesh without having 
to position themselves in the context of 
another existential threat towards the 
Bangladeshi state and society: the 
tremendous polarisation between the two 
antagonistic political parties in Bangladesh 
Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) and their 
respective leadership leading the country 
from crisis to crisis.  
 
To summarize, it seems that history is 
repeating itself. As in 1971, during the war 
of independence the international 
community, especially the US, was 
watching the genocide of three million 
people as well as the large-scale 
destruction of the economy and 
infrastructure in Bangladesh by West-
Pakistan apathetically. Today, there is an 
imminent threat that the very same 
countries once again remain idle while the 
collaborators of the then aggressors - who, 
slowly but persistently, built the backbone 
of Bangladesh’s fundamentalist movement 
over the past decades - penetrate the 
state and its institutions and oppress 
Bangladeshi society.  
 
The international community must realise 
the urgency of the situation. Both 
regionally and globally acting Islamic 
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fundamentalist movements are tightening 
their grip on Bangladesh. Since the early 
1990s, a silent process of Islamisation has 
started in the country. The breeding 
ground for this process was prepared by 
the country’s military rulers, General Ziaur 
Rahman (1975-1981) and General H.M. 
Ershad (1982-1990). During both 
autocratic governments, far reaching 
constitutional amendments were 
introduced which undermined the 
institutional bulwark, i.e. secularism and 
democracy, against a potential Islamist 
takeover. More concretely, Ziaur and 
Ershad diluted the secular principles in the 
constitution in order to gain legitimacy by 
playing the religious card. By anchoring 
Islam in the constitution and putting 
religion at the centre of the political 
discourse, Bangladesh was effectively 
transformed into an Islamic state. As a 
result, Islamist parties have been able to 
incrementally appropriate room in the 
political arena, despite the fact that they 
did not enjoy much general public support. 
It is interesting to mention that in this 
direction Pakistan serves as an interesting 
point of reference: the fact that Islamist 
parties do not get many votes does not 
mean that they are automatically 
marginalised when it comes to exercising 
political influence and access to state 
resources. Here, aggressive political 
behaviour combined with extra-judicial 
measures (e.g. black mailing, target 
killings, major terrorist activities) are used 
to compensate the lack in electoral 
support. Needless to say, as long as 
Islamist militant groups are seen as an 
instrument in certain policy fields, the 
imbalance between support by the people 
and influence on the political decision 
making process will continue.  
 
Having said that, after the reintroduction of 
parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh in 
1990/91, the Islamist parties (foremost 
Jammat-e-Islami and Islamic Okye Jyote) 
were already so deeply rooted into the 
political landscape that they continued to 
be part of elected governments. In result, 
they were not only using state resources 
to promote their ‘anti-secular revolution’ 
but also to push the entrenchment of 
Islamic fundamentalist elements deeply 
into the political-administrative structure of 
the country. Today, ‘Islamisation’ is not a 
silent process anymore: it is loud, 
aggressive and it has reached the centre 
of power politics in Dhaka.  
 
Furthermore, one has to stress that 
Islamic fundamentalism is not anymore an 
urban phenomenon. Islamist ideologies 
and radical views of how social order 
should be organised can be found with an 
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increasing extent in the daily lives of the 
people in remote rural areas. The high 
level of Islamist penetration of state and 
society in Bangladesh can not only be 
seen in the formulation of policies, 
including the blackmailing of whole 
governments and inconvenient political 
parties, but also in the context using 
coercive force  as an instrument to 
transform the country into an Islamic 
fundamentalist state. It is alarming that the 
Islamists are not even attempting to cover 
up the fact that they identify themselves 
with the Taliban and their former terror-
state the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 
which, according to some Islamists, should 
serve as a blueprint for restructuring 
Bangladesh’s political and social systems.  
 
However, it seems that the recent increase 
in reports of human rights abuses, 
violations of civil rights and constraints on 
political participation in the country have 
given the international community food for 
thought. The likelihood of a military 
intervention in civil-political affairs in order 
to avoid a clash between the AL and BNP 
(especially in the context of the upcoming 
general elections) will add to the tendency 
of foreign observers reassessing their view 
of the political situation. Indeed, it is of 
utmost importance that both foreign 
diplomats and the government of 
Bangladesh realise that the only way 
forward is to stop downplaying the Islamist 
threat. It is time to develop a coherent and 
stringent strategy against religious 
fundamentalism. Bangladesh’s secular 
and democratic principles are under 
tremendous pressure through radical 
political and militant extremism. The few 
measures carried out by the current 
government to contain the Islamist threats 
remain ineffective. For example, despite 
the fact that some Islamists groups are 
banned, their mobilising capacities and on-
going operations are still relatively strong. 
A reason for the fruitlessness of efforts to 
protect secularism and democracy is 
because they are negated in qualitative 
and quantitative terms by examples of how 
state institutions, major political actors, 
and Islamists are still cooperating with 
each other. The root thereof is the 
unrestricted political struggle between AL 
and BNP, which gave the Islamists 
additional room to manoeuvre in order to 
capture political space and power. Of 
course, there are many other factors too 
that contribute to the growth of Islamic 
radicalism in its political and militant forms 
in Bangladesh. First of all, there are 
domestic ones, e.g. corruption, bad 
governance, instability and a violent 
political culture, troubled civil-military 
relations, unfortunate socio-economic 
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conditions. Furthermore, there is also 
unquestionably a ‘foreign hand’ involved, 
which helps to facilitate and orchestrate 
the growth of the Islamic movement.  
 
Nevertheless, for the moment one can 
conclude that an Islamic state like the 
former Taliban regime in Afghanistan is still 
far from being established. But there are 
clear indications that the Islamists are 
aiming at achieving the implementation of 
such a form of governance and have 
already set patterns to prepare the ground 
for it. In order to stop this process, a 
collective national involvement of the 
major political actors is necessary to 
protect democracy, secularism and human 
rights, supported by a more determined 
and active international community. As 
long as this is not achieved, Bangladesh 
risks falling in the clutches of Islamic 
fundamentalism! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
